#iphone

Mastercard, in comparison, performs this validation correctly and the contrast reveals exactly where Visa fails. The over-the-limit attack succeeds against Visa for one central reason: when the attacker flips the bit in the Card Transaction Qualifiers (CTQ) telling the terminal “on-device authentication has been performed”, Visa does not cryptographically authenticate that field – nor does it cross-check it against the Issuer Application Data (IAD), which contains an independent record (in the Card Verification Results field) of whether Consumer Device Cardholder Verification Method (CDCVM) actually occurred. During the original disclosure process, Visa confirmed to the researchers the relevant data is present in the Application Cryptogram; the company simply does not validate it – whereas Mastercard does. The researchers proved this formally using the Tamarin verification tool: a Mastercard transaction cannot be approved at high value without genuine on-device authentication.

On the touch point of this exploit being one only affecting Apple’s iPhone, it is worth noting how Samsung Pay takes a different approach at the device level – authorising only zero-value transactions in transit mode, with the actual fare settled later through the transit system. This is effective, though it comes with trade-offs; like how fixed-fare transit systems requiring upfront charges are not supported. Apple could theoretically implement a similar restriction, yet doing so would break Express Transit for several transit networks worldwide. The more appropriate long-term solution requiring no compromise on device-level functionality, is simply for Visa to implement the same backend verification Mastercard already uses.

Visa’s official position, reiterated to Veritasium in 2026, is straightforward: the company does not believe the exploit is likely in a real-world setting. The attack requires physical proximity to (or possession of) the victim’s iPhone, specialised hardware, a rooted Android phone, and technical knowledge of EMV protocol manipulation. Visa further notes cardholders are covered by its ‘Zero Liability Policy’, allowing for any fraudulent transaction to be disputed and refunded. Anyone who has ever tried getting a refund from a bank for fraudulent activity will know how tedious and time consuming this process can be, and it is rather telling how Visa would rather put users through inconvenience than simply fixing the known security gap.

With that said, the company’s position is worth examining over outright dismissing. For a start, the hardware requirements are not trivial. Nefarious parties would require a Proxmark device, rooted Android phone, and laptop running custom relay software – all of which represent a higher barrier to entry than most opportunistic theft. Scaled deployment across hundreds of victims simultaneously is, indeed, impractical with current methods.

Even so, this defence has clear structural weaknesses. The existence of a known and, in this case, reproducible vulnerability in a payment network processing billions of transactions annually; cannot simply be mitigated by the argument of it being ‘difficult to exploit at scale’. Mastercard clearly agrees given how they have implemented protections against exactly this class of attack. Moreover, the equipment required is commercially available (the Proxmark, for instance, is an open-source RFID research tool), and the researchers’ methodology was published in full at a major academic conference. It also stands to reason how the barrier to replication lowers every year. Arguing a vulnerability is tolerable because exploitation is currently inconvenient is not a security posture… it is more akin to som

For anyone who regards the security of their financial data as a priority, the recommended course of action is clear and immediate: do not use a Visa card for Express Transit on an iPhone until either Apple or Visa deploys a fix.

To disable Express Transit for Visa on an iPhone, navigate to Settings, then Wallet and Apple Pay, then Express Transit Card, and select None; or assign either a Mastercard or American Express card to the feature instead. Both alternatives are, as of the publication of this article, immune to this specific Visa card vulnerability.

This approval comes down to how Apple builds security into its products. New iPhones and iPads rely on Apple silicon with a Secure Enclave that isolates sensitive data, like encryption keys and biometric information. They also use protections such as Face ID, Touch ID, and Memory Integrity Enforcement, which block entire classes of memory-based attacks before they run.

To be clear, NATO has not crowned the iPhone and iPad as its official devices. But it is validating that Apple's everyday hardware meets the bar for classified government use. In other words, the same phone in your pocket is trusted in environments once reserved for bespoke, locked-down hardware. It also reinforces Apple's claims that privacy and security are core decisions.

I figured out there is a second hotsport wifi named "PROjb3e11" that has to have "auto-Join" selected or wireless Carplay will never work. This is a different SSID if you subscribe to AT&T hotspot built into the Mach-E. It took a senior Apple "Genius" to figure this out. Ford tech should be aware of this. You need both a wifi and Bluetooth connection in order for wireless Carplay to work and you will have to manually set the "Auto Join" even after re-pairing the Bluetooth connection.