How Trump Decided to Go to War With Iran - The New York Times

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel walked into the Oval Office on the morning of Feb. 11, determined to keep the American president on the path to war.

For weeks, the United States and Israel had been secretly discussing a military offensive against Iran. But Trump administration officials had recently begun negotiating with the Iranians over the future of their nuclear program, and the Israeli leader wanted to make sure that the new diplomatic effort did not undermine the plans.

Over nearly three hours, the two leaders discussed the prospects of war and even possible dates for an attack, as well as the possibility — however unlikely — that President Trump might be able to reach a deal with Iran.

Days later, the U.S. president made clear publicly that he was skeptical of the diplomatic route, dismissing the history of negotiating with Iran as merely years of “talking and talking and talking.”

Asked by reporters if he wanted regime change in Iran, Mr. Trump said it “seems like that would be the best thing that could happen.”

Two weeks later, the president took the United States to war. He authorized a vast military bombardment in conjunction with Israel that swiftly killed the country’s supreme leader, pummeled Iranian civilian buildings and military nuclear sites, thrust the country into chaos and triggered violence across the region, leading to the deaths so far of six U.S. troops and scores of Iranian civilians. Mr. Trump has said more American casualties are likely as the United States digs in for an assault that could last weeks.

The U.S. decision to strike Iran was a victory for Mr. Netanyahu, who had been pushing Mr. Trump for months on the need to hit what he argued was a weakened regime. During a meeting at Mr. Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate in December, Mr. Netanyahu had asked for the president’s approval for Israel to hit Iran’s missile sites in the coming months.

Two months later, he got something even better: a full partner in a war to topple the Iranian leadership.

Israel was also not ready for the military campaign that Mr. Netanyahu had discussed with Mr. Trump during the Mar-a-Lago meeting in December. It needed more time to bolster its supply of missile interceptors and to deploy air defense batteries across Israel.

On Jan. 14, Mr. Netanyahu called Mr. Trump and asked him to delay any military strike until later in the month, when Israel’s defense preparations were complete. Mr. Trump agreed to wait.

The two leaders would speak several times in the weeks that followed. Mr. Netanyahu also conferred with Mr. Vance, Mr. Rubio and Steve Witkoff, the lead White House negotiator with Iran. Top Israeli military and intelligence officials flew to Washington, and Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, communicated regularly with Adm. Brad Cooper of U.S. Central Command.

There were few voices lobbying against military action. One exception was Tucker Carlson, the right-wing podcaster and close ally of the president, who has met with him in the Oval Office three times in the past month to argue against an attack.

He outlined the risks to U.S. military personnel, energy prices and Arab partners in the region if the United States went to war with Iran. He told the president that he should not be boxed in by Israel, arguing that its desire to attack Iran was the only reason the United States was even considering a strike. He encouraged Mr. Trump to restrain Mr. Netanyahu.

The president said he understood the risks of an attack, but he conveyed to Mr. Carlson that he had no choice but to join a strike that Israel would launch.

In the briefing, Mr. Rubio argued that, no matter if Israel or the United States struck first, Iran would respond with a powerful barrage of weapons against U.S. bases and embassies. It was logical then, Mr. Rubio said, that the United States should act in concert with Israel, since America would be dragged in anyway. And Israel, Mr. Rubio said, was determined to act.

This logic sat poorly with some Democrats, who thought the Trump administration was letting Mr. Netanyahu dictate American policy — and was making a circular argument that the United States had to attack because its military buildup could prompt Iran to strike.

The Iranians presented the Americans with a seven-page plan with proposed levels of future nuclear enrichment, numbers that alarmed Mr. Witkoff and Mr. Kushner.

The Americans still wanted the Iranians to commit to zero enrichment, and proposed giving them free nuclear fuel for a civil nuclear program, but the Iranians refused, a U.S. official said. After the talks ended, Mr. Witkoff and Mr. Kushner told Mr. Trump they did not think a deal could be reached.